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Bottleneck:  
The Place of County Jails in California’s COVID-19 
Correctional Crisis  
HADAR AVIRAM* ** 
Abstract 
This Article examines a lesser-known site of the COVID-19 
pandemic: county jails. Revisiting assumptions that preceded and 
followed criminal justice reform in California, particularly Brown v. 
Plata and the Realignment, the Article situates jails within two 
competing/complementary perspectives: a mechanistic, jurisdictional 
perspective, which focuses on county administration and budgeting, 
and a geographic perspective, which views jails in the context of their 
neighboring communities. The prevalence of the former perspective 
over the latter among both correctional administrators and criminal 
justice reformers has generated unique challenges in fighting the 
spread of COVID-19 in jails: paucity of, and reliability problems with, 
data; weak and decentralized healthcare policy featuring a wide 
variation of approaches; and serious litigation and legislation 
challenges. The Article concludes with the temptation and pitfalls of 
relying on the uniqueness of jails to advocate for vaccination and 
other forms of relief, and instead suggests propagating a geography-
based advocacy, which can benefit the correctional landscape as a 
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whole. 
Introduction 
Even against the overall abysmal management of the novel 
coronavirus (COVID-19) in the United States—as of February 14, 
close to 30 million cases and more than half a million deaths—the 
catastrophe wrought by the virus in correctional institutions stands out. 
The COVID-19 case rate for prisoners was 5.5 times higher than the 
US population case rate; when adjusted for age, mortality rates were 
3.0 times higher in prisons than in the national population.1 
Most of the national attention to COVID-19 in correctional 
settings has been drawn to state prisons; the outbreaks in some 
California prisons, notably Avenal2 and San Quentin,3 are widely 
regarded as the worst outbreaks nationwide. In some of these prisons, 
tragically, infection rates were so high that they reached natural herd 
immunity.4 By contrast, the medical disasters playing out in the 
country’s numerous county jails have received far less coverage, in 
itself an important observation. 
This Article sets out to correct that oversight by illuminating the 
special problems and challenges faced by county jails handling 
COVID-19. As I argue, the challenges of managing viral outbreaks in 
jails stem from a serious policymaking problem: a mechanical 
understanding of jails as jurisdictional, administrative units belonging 
to the county and answering to different masters than state prisons, 
rather than an organic perspective that sees them geographically 
embedded within counties that also include prisons, immigration 
detention facilities, and other entities. The mechanical-jurisdictional 
perception of jails has plagued not only their role in mass 
 
1 Brendan Saloner, et al., Cases and Deaths in Federal and State 
Prisons, 324 JAMA 602, 602-03 (2020).  
2 Kerry Klein, In California's Prison with the Worst COVID-19 Outbreak, Men Say 
Their Mental Health Is Suffering, KQED (Oct. 23, 
2020), https://www.kqed.org/news/11843335/in-californias-prison-with-the-wor.   
3 Bay Area News Group, Worst Coronavirus Outbreak in U.S.: A Timeline of How 
San Quentin Earned that Infamous Distinction, THE MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 4, 
2020), https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/08/04/timeline-san-quentin-overtakes-
ohio-prison-for-most-coronavirus-cases-in-u-s/.  
4 See Christie Aschwanden, The False Promise of Herd Immunity, 587 NATURE 26, 
27-28 (2020). 
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incarceration, but also their inappropriate use as the solution for 
population overflows and healthcare challenges in state prisons. In that 
respect, the remedy has been as misguided as the disease. The outcome 
of this misperception is the essence of the COVID-19 problem in jails: 
acting as bottlenecks for population destined for prison or for the 
community, they have sprouted outbreaks of their own, which are 
underreported, improperly addressed, and managed in a haphazard, 
decentralized fashion.  
 It is of historical interest that the linkage between congregate 
penitentiaries and disease was initially made in the context of jails, 
which preceded the emergence of modern prisons. While Eighteenth-
Century jails varied dramatically in ownership, management, and size, 
they were generally not used as places of punishment.5 Jail residents 
were a heterogenous hodgepodge, held or living there for multiple 
reasons—mentally ill people, criminal defendants awaiting trial or 
corporal punishment, and poor youth learning a trade—but what they 
had in common was poverty, which meant that they were 
malnourished and suffering from ill health prior to their incarceration.6 
Conditions within these unregulated facilities were abysmal: 
overcrowding was rampant, exposure to violence and victimization by 
the more vulnerable residents was common due to the mixed 
population, and no uniforms or food were provided, resulting in cold 
and hunger. The air was stale due to lack of ventilation; the facilities 
were never or seldom cleaned; and sometimes, raw sewage ran 
through the facilities.7  
 
5 Adam J. Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration 
in Early Massachusetts, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1180, 1187, 1194 (1982).   
6 See Ashley T. Rubin, Prison History, OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 




7 See Ashley T. Rubin, The Prehistory of Innovation: A Longer View of Penal 
Change, 20 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 192, 196-205 (2018); Ashley T. Rubin, Prisons 
and Jails are Coronavirus Epicenters – But They Were Once Designed 
to Prevent Disease Outbreaks, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 15, 
2020), https://theconversation.com/prisons-and-jails-are-coronavirus-epicenters-
but-they-were-once-designed-to-prevent-disease-outbreaks-136036; Hadar Aviram, 
Introductory Remarks at the University of California Hastings Race and Poverty 
Law Journal California Correctional Crisis: Mass Incarceration, Healthcare, and the 
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As a consequence, disease ran rampant through jails. Eighteenth-
century reformer John Howard mentioned the dreadful legacy of the 
Black Assize of 1577, during which “all those who were present died 
within forty hours; the Lord Chief Baron, the Sheriff, and three 
hundred more.”8 He also referred to several smaller outbreaks, which 
had occurred between the 1730s and 1750s in various locations, such 
as Taunton and Devonshire.9 In Howard’s time, foul air was thought 
to be the cause of various diseases, including yellow fever and goal 
fever; Howard wrote of “guarding [him]self by smelling to vinegar, 
while I was in those places, and changing my apparel afterwards.” 
After these visits, his clothes were “so offensive, that in a post-chaise 
I could not bear the windows drawn up, and was therefore often 
obliged to travel on horseback. The leaves of my memorandum book 
were often so tainted that that I could not use it till after spreading it 
an hour or two before the fire.” Indeed, the jailers themselves, fearing 
infection, had “made excuses and did not go with me into the felons 
wards.”10  
The legacy of filth and disease left its impression on American 
prison reformers; indeed, the next generation of prisons, such as 
Walnut Street Penitentiary (opened in 1773)11 and Eastern State 
Penitentiary (opened in 1829)12 were designed with the deliberate aim 
to prevent the spread of disease. But as Jonathan Simon has noted,13 
the transition to larger, isolated institutions, had adverse implications 
 
COVID-19 Outbreak (Feb. 5, 2021), http://sites.uchastings.edu/journal-
symposium/speakers-video/. 
8 Dolly Stolze, The Curse of Rowland Jenkins and the Oxford Assize of 
1577, BREWMINATE (Nov. 3, 2017), https://brewminate.com/the-curse-of-rowland-
jenkins-and-the-oxford-assize-of-1577/.  
9 JOHN HOWARD, THE STATE OF THE PRISONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 5, 18-19 
(Eyres 1777), https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_State_of_the_Prisons_i
n_England_and/4EhNAAAAYAAJ?hl=en. 
10 Id. at 13.  
11 MICHAEL MERANZE, LABORATORIES OF VIRTUE: PUNISHMENT, REVOLUTION, 
AND AUTHORITY IN PHILADELPHIA, 1760-1835, at 183 (Omohundro Inst. of Early 
Am. Hist. and Culture and the Univ. of North Carolina Press 1996).   
12 ASHLEY T. RUBIN, THE DEVIANT PRISON: PHILADELPHIA'S EASTERN STATE 
PENITENTIARY AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA'S MODERN PENAL SYSTEM, 1829-
1913, at xxiv (Cambridge Univ. Press 2021). 
13 Jonathan Simon, The New Gaol: Seeing Incarceration Like a City, 664 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 280, 295 (2016).   
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as to the perception of incarceration. One of them was the decreased 
visibility of the incarcerated population, locked away in sterile and 
distant facilities, which Simon argues led to seeing confinement “like 
a state” rather than “like a city.”14 These new carceral settings 
removed problems from the public eye and discouraged community-
oriented solutions for overcrowding and healthcare problems. By 
contrast, Simon argued, jails can furnish the necessary link with the 
wider community that can facilitate a more holistic perspective on 
reform.  
Simon’s perspective, which hailed jails as the hopeful site of 
criminal justice reform, reflected the sentiment of advocates statewide 
at a unique moment in California’s correctional history: the landmark 
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Plata,15 which upheld a 
population reduction order by a federal three-judge panel. Healthcare 
in California’s state prisons had been abysmal for decades, and the 
evidence before the Plata court incontrovertibly demonstrated neglect 
and incompetence at a massive scale.16 Even before the order, state 
officials and the legislature were scrambling to alleviate the problem, 
declared by then-Governor Schwarzenegger a state of emergency.17 
The Schwarzenegger administration attempted to ameliorate the crisis 
through a jurisdiction-based solution: changing some offense 
categories from felonies to “wobblers”, which granted prosecutors the 
discretion to charge them as misdemeanors resulting in county jail 
sentences in lieu of state prison time.18 As this effort was joined by 
judicial pressure to reduce the prison population, the subsequent 
administration, under Governor Jerry Brown, embarked upon an 
ambitious legislative project that came to be known as the “Great 
Experiment”: The Criminal Justice Realignment.19 Jails, as I explain 
 
14 Id. at 297.  
15 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 545 (2011).  
16 See JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT 
DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA, 87-109 (2014).  
17 Donald Specter, Everything Revolves Around Overcrowding: The State of 
California's Prisons, 22 FED SENT’G REP., 194, 194-95 (The New Press 2010).  
18 Hadar Aviram, The Inmate Export Business and Other Financial Adventures: 
Correctional Policies for Times of Austerity, 11 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. 
J. 111, 112-13 (2014).  
19 Joan Petersilia, Realigning Corrections, California Style, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 8, 10 (2016). 
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in later detail in this Article, were perceived by many of us in the 
scholarship and advocacy realms as the ideal depressurizing valve for 
California corrections not only because conditions in state prisons had 
been so abysmal, but also because the jails’ proximity to, and shared 
budget with, counties was perceived to provide strong economic 
incentive to reduce correctional populations by internalizing the costs 
of incarceration. This would end the accountability problem of 
sentencing people at the county level to prison stints that would be 
funded from state budgets, to which Franklin Zimring, Gordon 
Hawkins, and later W. David Ball20, referred to as the “correctional 
free lunch.” 
Nevertheless, even at the time, advocates and scholars expressed 
concerns that the problems in prisons could duplicate themselves in 
jails. Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin’s analysis of judicial 
intervention in correctional management is rife with examples of poor 
jail conditions.21 Perhaps the most prophetic commentator was Margo 
Schlanger, who in her seminal paper on Plata and Realignment 
warned against a “hydra’s heads” problem—namely, that rather than 
one landmark lawsuit against the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), advocates would end up 
litigating dozens of separate lawsuits against county sheriffs about 
conditions in jails.22 
This Article essentially sets out to explain why, and how, 
Schlanger has been proven right. In Part I, I introduce two 
complementary perspectives on jails: a mechanic-jurisdictional 
approach, which sees jails as unique because of their jurisdictional 
position as county institutions, and an organic-geographic approach, 
which perceives jails through the lens of carceral geography, as 
carceral locations engaged in constant contact with other carceral 
 
20 W. David Ball, A False Idea of Economy: Costs, Counties, and the Origins of the 
California Correctional System, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 26, 27-
28 (2016).  
21 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 111-
14 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998). See also Bailey Heaps, Note, The Most Adequate 
Branch: Courts as Competent Prison Reformers, 9 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & 
CIV. LIBERTIES 281 (2013).  
22 Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and 
Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.- C. L. L. REV. 165, 210-11 (2013).  
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institutions and with their surrounding communities. I argue that these 
perspectives should be seen as complementary, rather than competing, 
and rely on their synthesis to explicate the porousness of the jail 
membrane and thus its vulnerability to multiple problems, including 
(but not limited to) viral infections and outbreaks. 
Part II demonstrates the pitfalls of relying on the jurisdictional 
approach and excluding the geographic one by explaining the 
aftermath of Brown v. Plata and the Realignment. Specifically, I 
explore the problem of the “correctional free lunch.” Many of us in the 
advocacy and reform arena saw this as the main problem underpinning 
incarceration: the lack of financial accountability by county 
prosecutors and judges sentencing people to prison for felonies and 
relying on the state to pick up the ever-rising tab. I show how 
internalizing the costs of incarceration by imposing them at the county 
level was an essential component of the legislative reform strategy, 
and how this led to the decentralization of correctional approaches 
throughout the state: the establishment of the Board of State and 
Community Corrections (BSCC) as a loose supervisory structure, the 
squabbles over budget allocations, and the wide variation of 
correctional strategies among counties, ranging from preemptive 
decarceration and diversion to the expansion and construction of 
county jails.  
In Part III, the chickens tragically come home to roost. Here, I 
review how the characteristics of jurisdictional reform—
decentralization and variation—have imbued the COVID-19 crisis in 
county facilities with a unique flavor. First, I explain the paucity and 
unreliability of data at the jail level as a function of decentralization 
and the lack of leadership from BSCC, and show how nonprofits, 
academic institutions, news agencies, and private individuals stepped 
up to fill the knowledge gap about COVID-19 in jails through exposés 
and independent data collection efforts. Then, I examine the 
experience of COVID-19 in California jails, showing that its main 
features—overcrowding, lack of protective equipment and sanitation, 
toxic approaches among staff members, and a shortage of medical 
staffing, were compounded by a protective mechanism exercised by 
state prisons: shutting down transfers from jails. This, in turn, 
necessitated a “domino effect” of strategies, including an emergency 
zero-bail initiative to depopulate the jails. I then show the uphill battle 
that people incarcerated in jails have faced litigating COVID-19 
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challenges in jails, focusing on the example of the Orange County 
jails.  
The Article concludes with the prospect of vaccinating the jail 
population, complicating the picture of advocacy on behalf of people 
housed in jails. I warn against overreliance on one “jail-specific” 
argument for vaccination: the presumed innocence of pretrial jail 
detainees. Instead, I suggest relying on arguments with a geographic 
appeal: the transience of jail populations and the ease of administering 
a vaccination program through the counties, and recommend a joint 
strategy of jails, state prisons, federal prisons, and ICE detention 
facilities, to vaccinate all incarcerated populations.  
Part I: Two Perspectives on County Jails 
 
With an annual national admission of close to 12 million people23 
in more than 3,000 jails24—1 million of them in California’s25 more 
than 160 facilities26--jails are an important component of the criminal 
justice system. As in the majority of states,27 California’s jails are 
administered at the county level; most of the state’s jails are 
 
23 Ram Subramanian et al., Incarceration’s Front Door: The Misuse of Jails in 
America, VERA INST. OF JUST. (2015), 
https://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/incarcerations-front-door-report.pdf.   
24 See Todd D. Minton & Daniela Golinell, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2013 - Statistical 
Tables, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 
(2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim13st.pdf.   
25 Ryken Grattet et al., California’s County Jails in the Era of 
Reform,	 PUB. POL’Y INST. OF 
CAL. (2016), https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_916RGR.pdf.   
26 List of California county jails, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_California_county_jails (last visited Apr. 23, 
2021); List of California state prisons, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_California_state_prisons (last visited Apr. 23, 
2021); California Federal Prisons, PRISONER RESOURCE, 
https://www.prisonerresource.com/federal-prisons/california/ (last visited Apr. 22, 
2021). 
27 In six states—Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont—both prisons and jails are under the jurisdiction of the state’s Department 
of Corrections. See Barbara Krauth, A Review of the Jail Function within State 
Unified Corrections Systems, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 
(1997), https://nicic.gov/sites/default/files/014024.pdf. 
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administered by a single county, and a handful of jails serve multiple 
counties. Most jails are located in counties in which there are also 
other types of correctional institutions: state prisons, state and local 
juvenile facilities, federal prisons, and ICE detention facilities.28 Until 
the COVID-19 crisis, California jails spent years near or above their 
total capacity of 79,093 beds. The use of release mechanisms, which 
will be discussed in this Article, led to a population drop; as of January 
2020, California’s jail population is 57,568. The jail population is 
heterogenous: as of September 2020, 75% of it (43,148 people) 
consisted of pretrial detainees.29 The remaining people in jail are a mix 
of locally sentenced people for minor crimes, apprehended probation 
or parole violators, and state-sentenced people serving time on the 
county level to alleviate overcrowding in state prisons. Since the 
passage of Proposition 47, approximately 90% of the people in 
California jails are either sentenced or awaiting trial for felonies.30  
The unique patterns and composition of jail populations can be 
understood through two complementary frameworks: a mechanical-
jurisdictional perspective, which examines their budgeting and 
administration, and an organic-geographic perspective, which views 
them in relation to their surrounding communities. 
The Mechanical-Jurisdictional Perspective 
 
In a recent article, Ashley Rubin and Michelle Phelps 
problematize the use of the term “carceral state,” which simplistically 
implies that there is a single, unified, and actor-less state responsible 
 
28 See Jails and Prisons in California, L.A. 
SHERIFF’S DEP’T, https://app5.lasd.org/iic/maps/Prisons-ALL-MAPS1.html (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2021).  
29 Sentenced and Non-Sentenced ADP, BOARD OF STATE AND COMMUNITY 
CORRECTIONS DATABASE, 
https://public.tableau.com/profile/kstevens#!/vizhome/ACJROctober2013/About 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2021). Nationwide, approximately two thirds of the jail 
population are under pretrial detention: Natalie R. Ortiz, County Jails at a 
Crossroads: An Examination of the Jail Population and Pretrial Release, 
2 NAT’L ASS’N COUNTIES 5 (2015), https://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/docu
ments/County%20Jails%20at%20a%20Crossroads%20-
%20Full%20Report_updated.pdf.   
30 BSCC DATABASE, supra note 29. 
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for punishment. By contrast to this fictional entity, real-life carcerality 
is characterized by fragmentation, variegation, and constant conflict 
across the actors and institutions that shape penal policy and 
practice.31 An obvious example of this is the basic distinction between 
prisons and jails: generally speaking, the former facilities are run and 
funded by the state, and the latter operate under the auspices and 
budget of counties.  
This distinction has several important implications. As a Vera 
Institute report32 explains, the size of jail populations and the length of 
time spent cycling through jails are a function of a series of decisions 
made by largely autonomous system actors: the police who choose to 
arrest, release, or book people into jail; prosecutors who determine 
whether to charge or divert arrested persons; pretrial services program 
providers who make custody and release recommendations; judges, 
magistrates, or bail commissioners who decide whom to detain or 
release, and under what conditions; other court actors, from attorneys 
and judges to administrators, whose action or inaction can accelerate 
or delay pending cases; and community corrections agencies who 
choose how and when to respond to persons who violate their 
conditions of supervision in the community. Release and detention 
decisions may also depend on the existence of critical community 
services that can provide the supports needed to keep people charged 
with crimes out of custody. To these criteria we must add, especially 
in California, legislative actors who engage in jurisdictional 
gymnastics, such as creating new offenses or changing offense 
categories, with particular carceral destinations (jails or prisons) in 
mind.  
The relative independence of these actors, and their diverse (and 
sometimes contradictory) goals, make it difficult to align their efforts 
to control the use of jails. Some of these actors may be more aware 
than others of the share of jails in the county budget and take it into 
account when managing jail intake and releases. Others yet may 
believe that jails are inappropriate to house certain residents, such as 
people serving long stretches of time for serious offenses. These 
 
31 Ashley Rubin & Michelle Phelps, Fracturing the Penal State: State Actors and 
the Role of Conflict in Penal Change, 21 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 422, 423 
(2017). 
32 SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 18. 
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categories of people may be in need of long-term programming that 
would be difficult to administer in facilities originally conceived as 
temporary housing for people on trial (or even for people who are 
booked for just a few days.)  
As explained in a National Institute of Corrections report33, the 
population dynamics of jails are a function of multiple questions: 
What is the purpose of the jail, who is in the jail, how people enter and 
exit it, and how long they remain at the jail. The entrance and exit 
doors are jurisdictional valves: some people enter jail upon arrest, 
from the community, while some enter after they are sentenced; some 
people spend a few days in jail, whereas some serve years’ long 
sentences there; some exit the jail directly into the community, while 
some shift to other jurisdictions, through a state prison sentence, an 
ICE hold, or a federal hold. The population’s heterogeneity and the 
multiplicity of entrance and exit doors make predictive modeling 
difficult. This is compounded by the fact that individual counties 
cannot reliably plan intake and exit using aggregate data. Mass 
incarceration is regarded a national problem and is analyzed at the 
national or state level, but the structure of jails and their location in the 
administrative hierarchy means that they are “first responders” in the 
criminal process—an example of what public policy scholars have 
referred to as “disjointed federalism.”34  
The Organic-Geographic Perspective 
 
By contrast to the jurisdictional perspective, an organic-
geographical perspective examines the continuity between jails and 
surrounding communities. Even a superficial glance at the California 
map reveals that jails are embedded in cities and rural communities, 
and often not that distant, geographically, from prisons and detention 
 
33 Mark A. Cunniff, Jail Crowding: Understanding Jail Population Dynamics, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 2002), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/017209.pdf.  
34 In the defense context, see Tyler Prante & Alok K. Bohara, What Determines 
Homeland Security Spending? An Econometric Analysis of the Homeland Security 
Grant Program, POL’Y STUD. J. 243 (2008); Erica Chenoweth & Susan E. 
Clarke, All Terrorism Is Local: Resources, Nested Institutions, and Governance for 
Urban Homeland Security in the American Federal System, 63 POL. RSCH. Q. 495, 
495-98 (2010).  
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facilities. Indeed, thinking about jails as part of a carceral continuum 
should be precisely because of their multiple intersections with 
various communities and facilities.  
Studies in carceral geography35 have examined, for example, the 
complicated political,36 economic,37 and cultural38 reasons for siting 
correctional facilities at particular locations. Other studies show the 
carceral aspects of localities and sites beyond ostensible carceral 
spaces, such as gentrified downtown areas, statewide overnight buses, 
spatial restrictions on sex offenders, gang members, and electronically 
monitored homes.39  
These works illuminate the carceral continuum, of which jails are 
an essential part, both literally and figuratively. A bus transferring 
people from jail to prison is, technically, traversing jurisdictions, but 
at the same time it creates a continuum of carceral power by smoothly 
 
35 DOMINIQUE MORAN, CARCERAL GEOGRAPHY: SPACES AND PRACTICES OF 
INCARCERATION 60 (Routledge 2018). 
36 RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND 
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 93–94 (U.C. Press, 2007); 
Dale Sechrest, Locating Prisons: Open Versus Closed Approaches to 
Siting, 38 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 88, 88 (1992); KATHLEEN SHEA ABRAMS & 
WILLIAM LYONS, IMPACT OF CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES ON LAND VALUES AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 2 (U.S. Dep’t of Just., 1987). 
37 Susan Blankenship & Ernest Yanarella, Prison Recruitment as a Policy Tool of 
Local Economic Development: A Critical 
Evaluation, 7 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 183, 185 (2004); Matthew D. Vanden 
Bosch, Rural Prison Siting: Problems and Promises, 1 MID-
SOUTHERN J. OF CRIM. JUST. 1, 3 (2020); Tracy Huling, Building a Prison Economy 
in Rural America, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
MASS IMPRISONMENT 197 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); 
Shaun Genter et al., Prisons, Jobs and Privatization: The Impact of Prisons on 
Employment Growth in Rural U.S. Counties, 1997-2004, IN THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST (Jan. 2013), https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-
content/uploads/prisonsJobsPrivatization-SSR-2.pdf; JOHN EASON, BIG HOUSE ON 
THE PRAIRIE: RISE OF THE RURAL GHETTO AND PENAL 
PROLIFERATION 3 (Univ. of Chi. Press, 2017). 
38 Joelle Fraser, American Seduction: Portrait of a Prison Town, 39 MICH. Q. 
REV. 1, 2–3 (2000); PRISON TOWN, USA (Public Broadcasting Services 2007). For 
an analogy between prison towns and cattle towns, see KAREN MORIN, CARCERAL 
SPACE, PRISONERS AND ANIMALS (Routledge 2018). 
39 BRETT STORY, PRISON LAND: MAPPING CARCERAL POWER ACROSS NEOLIBERAL 
AMERICA (Univ. of Minn. Press 2019); THE PRISON IN TWELVE LANDSCAPES (Oh 
Ratface Films 2016). 
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transitioning people between geographic locations without a break in 
carcerality. More figuratively, the shift from the outside world into a 
jail is not as abrupt as the jurisdictional perspective suggests if one 
considers the carceral elements embedded in practices such as drug 
testing in workplaces,40 meting out discipline in schools,41 and 
surveillance of homes42 and neighborhoods43--oft referred to through 
the apt metaphor of a “pipeline.” Even technological tools operating 
within the private sector, such as the use of software for predictive 
policing,44 the racialization of surveillance in employment, buying, 
and selling,45 limitations on financial mobility through the creation of 
credit scores,46 and the employment of surveillance tactics, offered by 
loss prevention corporations, to employees in the retail industry,47 
serve as conduits of carceral power, creating a continuous stream 
 
40 DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS 
OF MARKETS 184 (Samuel Freeman ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010).  
41 JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF 
FEAR 208 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007); VICTOR M. RIOS, HUMAN TARGET: SCHOOLS, 
POLICE, AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LATINO YOUTH 35–36 (Univ. of Chi. Press 
2017). 
42 Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L. J. 2, 62 (2006). 
43 LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF 
SOCIAL INSECURITY (Duke Univ. Press 2009); ANGELA DAVIS, ARE PRISONS 
OBSOLETE? 46 (Seven Sisters Press 2003); see also JORDAN CAMP, INCARCERATING 
THE CRISIS: FREEDOM STRUGGLES AND THE RISE OF THE NEOLIBERAL 
STATE 17 (U.C. Press 2016). 
44 Andrea Miller, Shadows of War, Traces of Policing: The Weaponization of Space 
and the Sensible in Preemption, in CAPTIVATING TECHNOLOGY: RACE, CARCERAL 
TECHNOSCIENCE, AND LIBERATORY IMAGINATION IN EVERYDAY 
LIFE 86 (Ruha Benjamin ed., 2019); R. Joshua Scannell, This Is Not Minority 
Report: Predictive Policing and Population Racism, in CAPTIVATING 
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 44, at 107; WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., PREDICTIVE 
POLICING: THE ROLE OF CRIME FORECASTING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OPERATIONS 18–19 (RAND 2013). 
45 Winifred R. Poster, Racialized Surveillance in the Digital Service 
Economy, in CAPTIVATING TECHNOLOGY, supra note 44, at 138. 
46 Tamara K. Nopper, Digital Character in “The Scored Society”: FICO, Social 
Networks, and Competing Measurements of Creditworthiness, in CAPTIVATING 
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 44, at 170. 
47 Madison Van Oort, Employing the Carceral Imaginary: An Ethnography of 
Worker Surveillance in the Retail Industry, in CAPTIVATING 
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 44, at 213. 
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between “the outside” and the jail space. Complicating the picture is 
the variety of uses of the jail itself, including as an inadvertent but 
increasingly vital component of the healthcare safety net.48 
 The importance of supplementing the jurisdictional perspective 
with the geographic one cannot be overstated. If one considers jails 
separately, framing the entrances and exits as valves in and out of 
separate, disjointed jurisdictions that can be open and closed at will, 
policymaking for one level of government may completely overlook 
the other. By contrast, thinking of jails as one area in a smooth carceral 
continuum requires taking them into account when planning policies 
involving population control and management. As the next part shows, 
the Achilles heel of the Plata/Realignment solution to the prison 
healthcare crisis was that it focused exclusively on the jurisdictional 
aspect. 
Part II: Criminal Justice Reform through the Jurisdictional 
Prism: Jails as the Solution to Prison Problems  
The Correctional Free Lunch Problem and Its Solutions 
 
 Decades before the Criminal Justice Realignment relied on a 
jurisdictional shift to achieve population reduction in prisons, scholars 
pointed to a basic problem contributing to mass incarceration. 
Elegantly referred to by Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins as the 
“correctional free lunch,”49 it was essentially an argument about 
economic externalities: prosecutors charge felonies, and judges 
sentence people convicted of them, in county courts, whereas the 
sentence itself takes place in state prisons. This means that the county 
never “feels” the costs associated with the sentence, and therefore does 
not take them into account when dishing out lengthy sentences.  
 Several solutions were proposed for the correctional free lunch 
problem. Zimring and Hawkins themselves advocated for 
homogenizing sentencing policies at the state level, through the work 
 
48 Jails: Inadvertent Healthcare Providers, PEW CHARITABLE TRUST (Jan. 2018), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2018/01/sfh_jails_inadvertent_health_car
e_providers.pdf. 
49 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 211–
15 (Univ. of Chi. Press, 1991).  
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of a sentencing commission.50 Other scholars have argued that judges 
should be informed of the cost of incarceration, and offered empirical 
proof that, when they are informed, judges tend to sentence more 
leniently.51 
 As the healthcare crisis in state prisons raged, another solution 
emerged: shifting the responsibility of incarceration to the counties 
who mete out the punishment. The Schwarzenegger Administration’s 
initiative to reconfigure nonviolent felonies as “wobblers”—offenses 
that can be prosecuted as felonies or as misdemeanors—were designed 
to offer prosecutors the option to dictate whether the sentence would 
be served in a state prison (for a felony) or in a county jail (for a 
misdemeanor). But prosecutorial discretion would prove insufficient 
to solve the problem of disease and neglect in prisons; The pressure to 
solve this problem was augmented by the advent of the 2008 financial 
crisis, which hurt state and local correctional budgets,52 and by the 
growing sense that federal courts would intervene with a population 
reduction order. Indeed, a federal three-judge panel heard evidence 
according to which, every six days, a prisoner in California died of a 
preventable, and often iatrogenic, condition. 
 As Margo Schlanger recounts,53 the Brown Administration’s 
response to this multifaceted state prison crisis—the enactment of 
A.B. 109—was for the most part a jurisdictional shift initiative. Under 
the Realignment, people convicted of nonserious, nonviolent, and 
nonsexual crimes (colloquially known as the “non-non-nons”) would 
serve their sentences in county jails, granting sheriffs the authority to 
 
50 For commentary on this idea, see Kevin R. Reitz, Zimring, Hawkins, and the 
Macro Problems of Imprisonment, 87 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604, 621–
22 (1997).  
51 Lynn S. Branham, Follow the Leader: The Advisability and Propriety of 
Considering Cost and Recidivism Data 
at Sentencing, 24 FED. SENT’G REP.169, 169 (2012); Monica Davey, Missouri Tells 
Judges Cost of Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 
2020),  https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/us/19judges.html; HADAR AVIRAM, 
CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 22 (U.C. Press 2015); Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Should 
Judges Know the Costs of Sentencing Options at their Disposal? VERA INST. OF 
JUST. (Mar. 1, 2011), https://www.vera.org/blog/should-judges-know-the-costs-of-
sentencing-options-at-their-disposal.  
52 AVIRAM, supra note 51, at 51. 
53 Schlanger, supra note 22, at 184. 
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release them if necessary. In addition, most post-sentence supervision, 
which used to be under the auspices of state parole authorities, shifted 
to county probation offices, and parole revocations also became a 
county matter.  
 Lest it appear that the jurisdictional shift was the product of 
calculated econometrics, Schlanger convincingly explains it as a last 
resort strategy: jails had 10,000 available beds at the time and, given 
the population reduction order’s approval by the Supreme Court, using 
them for state prisons was deemed the only palatable solution because, 
as the prison’s healthcare Federal Receiver Clark Kelso explained, 
"politically, nobody could tolerate a straight release of inmates prior 
to serving their sentence.” County authorities “went along with this 
approach, albeit reluctantly. As Orange County Sheriff Sandra 
Hutchens explain[ed to Schlanger], ‘We had no choice. The State had 
to deal with the three-judge panel and reduce population. The sheriffs 
were given the option of working with the State on a plan, or the State 
releasing tens of thousands of prisoners early, with no supervision.’”54 
However, overall, reformers and advocates hailed the jurisdictional 
shift as a method of deliverance from the deep failures of the state 
correctional apparatus. Some of the support for Realignment came 
from the perception that no healthcare provided by the counties could 
possibly be worse than the dysfunctional, neglectful healthcare 
nightmare of the state prison system which, at the time, had already 
been under federal Receivership for five years.55  
 At the same time, some tried to inject econometric reason into the 
chaotic funding method of the plan, whose success, after all, would 
depend on the extent to which the counties would internalize the costs 
of their own appetites for incarceration. Under Realignment, over $1 
billion annually of state sales tax revenue, phased in over several 
years, was shifted from the state to the counties, and $1.2 billion in jail 
construction bonds that had been authorized in 2007 was to be 
accelerated. This, as Schlanger notes, was known to be insufficient to 
fund the transition even at the time; the “sweetener” of the deal was 
 
54 Id. at 186.  
55 Marvin Mentor, Federal Court Seizes California Prisons Medical Care; Appoints 
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that the counties would have absolute freedom in spending the money, 
which was to be awarded as a block grant. Counties could use the 
money as they saw fit: invest in diversion programs and treatment to 
prevent incarceration or increase jail capacity. 
 The problem with relying on this allocation technique as an 
incarceration appetite suppressant was the allocation technique, which 
relied on a formula using the number of offenders that each county 
had sent to state prison, the county's adult population, and prior grant 
funding. Counties that had invested in alternatives to incarceration 
prior to realignment complained that they were being penalized for 
their good work, while more punitive counties were rewarded for their 
punitiveness with a larger share of the pie. In a series of important 
papers,56 W. David Ball proposed tweaking the formula in a way that 
would exercise a bit more control over the counties by incorporating a 
proxy for their need to rely on incarceration: violent crime rates in 
each county. Under this system, Ball proposed, “[l]ocalities would 
receive funds based on reported rates of violent crime and would be 
free to spend these monies on prison, diversion, jail, or anything else. 
The state would continue to administer prisons but would charge 
counties for every prisoner they sent.” This plan would “end the 
correctional free lunch” by making the trade-offs obvious to county 
officials. Counties that would retain or even increase their 
incarceration rates would be free to do so, but they would have to fund 
it on their own; moreover, they would face political accountability for 
their choices, because “[t]he average person could more easily spot the 
linkage between increasing numbers of prisoners and, say, a decrease 
in the frequency of road repairs or a shorter public school year, 
allowing political checks on criminal justice to operate more 
effectively.” Whether this strategy would work was still unknown; 
Joan Petersilia observed that, “if it [did] not work, counties [would] be 
overwhelmed with diverted inmates, unable to operate needed 
programs, which ultimately results in continued criminality and jail 
 
56 W. D. Ball, Tough on Crime (On The State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not 
Drive California Counties’ Incarceration Rates—and Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 987, 988 (2013); W. David Ball, Defunding State Prisons, 50 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 1060, 1060 (2014); W. David Ball, “A False Idea of Economy”: Costs, 
Counties, and the Origins of the California Correctional System, 664 ANNALS OF 
THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 26 (2016). 
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(instead of prison) crowding.”57 
The Establishment of the Board of State and Community 
Corrections (BSCC) and the Effort to Share County Data 
 As a consequence of Realignment, the state established the BSCC, 
a loose resource and regulator for the counties as they were imbued 
with their new responsibilities that reports directly to the Governor. 
The BSCC website identifies it as an “independent statutory agency 
that provides leadership to the adult and juvenile criminal justice 
systems, expertise on Public Safety Realignment issues, a data and 
information clearinghouse, and technical assistance on a wide range 
of community corrections issues” as well as “promulgates regulations 
for adult and juvenile detention facilities, conducts regular inspections 
of those facilities, develops standards for the selection and training of 
local corrections and probation officers, and administers significant 
public safety-related grant funding.” 
The idea of the BSCC as a liaison mechanism between 
community stakeholders is evident in its composition. As of now, per 
its website, it consists of a Chair, two CDCR officials (the Secretary 
and the Director of Adult Parole Operations), two county sheriffs, two 
county chief probation officers, one retired judge, one chief of police, 
and three representatives of diversion and rehabilitation programs (one 
position is vacant.)58  
The BSCC’s role as information clearinghouse for the counties 
was especially important given the decentralized nature of county 
data. In 2016, at the request of the BSCC, the U.S. Justice 
Department's Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Diagnostic Center 
evaluated the BSCC’s data collection enterprise, resulting in the 
development of a self-evaluation checklist for California counties to 
follow in adhering to sound data and information-sharing principles. 
The checklist consisted of four principles: using national approaches 
for interagency information exchange and strategy development; 
using data to support informed justice and public-safety 
decisionmaking; developing responsible information-sharing policies, 
 
57 Joan Petersilia, Realigning Corrections, California Style, 664 ANNALS OF THE AM. 
ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 7 (2016). 
58 Meet the 13 Board Members, BSCC 
CALIFORNIA, 	https://www.bscc.ca.gov/s_thebsccboard/.  
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including by connecting existing networks and systems with strong 
identity, access, and discovery capabilities; and cross-boundary 
information-sharing and collaboration with input from all involved 
stakeholders.59 Despite this initiative, information about jails would 
continue to be disseminated primarily through the respective sheriff’s 
departments, with a few notable exceptions, chief among which are 
the jail profile survey (administered since the 1970s, but now under 
the auspices of the BSCC)60, the jail population dashboard,61 and a few 
reports on inspection of local detention facilities.62 By comparison to 
the detailed population reports and annual population data conducted 
by CDCR and provided on its website,63 the BSCC database is 
underwhelming; specific functions, such as inmate locators, are 
accessible only at the individual county level,64 and the respective 
websites for the different sheriff’s departments vary widely by style, 
quality, clarity, and amount of available information.65 
 
59 Promising Practices in the Use of Data and Justice Information Sharing: A Self-
Evaluation Resource for California Counties, OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS (June 
2016), https://www.ojp.gov/library/abstracts/promising-practices-use-data-and-
justice-information-sharing-self-evaluation. 
60 Jail Profile Survey Querying, BSCC 
CALIFORNIA, 	https://app.bscc.ca.gov/joq//jps/QuerySelection.asp. 
61 Jail Population Dashboard, BSCC 
CALIFORNIA, 	https://public.tableau.com/profile/kstevens#!/vizhome/ACJROctober
2013/About. 
62 BSCC Inspection Reports, BSCC 
CALIFORNIA,  https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/16k0lLN2nGQreJv0TdaKvL
qToRyZa_jpZ. 
63 Office of Research, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. AND 
REHAB., https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/research/. 
64 See, e.g., Inmate Locator, ALAMEDA CTY. OF 
CAL., https://www.acgov.org/sheriff_app/.   
65 A sense of the “flavor” of a local sheriff’s department is discernible from its 
website. ALAMEDA COUNTY SHERIFF’S 
DEPARTMENT, https://www.alamedacountysheriff.org/ (last visited Mar. 31, 
2021); MENDOCINO COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, https://mendocinosheriff.com/ (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2021); VENTURA COUNTY 
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, https://www.venturasheriff.org/ (last visited Mar. 31, 
2021); YOLO COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, https://www.yolocountysheriff.com/ (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2021). Notably, all of these websites contain more information and 
significantly more accessible display and search functions than the BSCC data 
pages. 
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Admittedly, county jails differ from state prisons in that transfers 
between counties are much rarer than transfers between state prisons, 
which at first blush obviates the need for a centralized inmate locator 
function. The problem is that transfers between jails and prisons are 
extremely common; as we have seen, most of the jail population 
consists of pretrial detainees, many of whom will eventually serve 
state sentences. Not only does BSCC’s data dissemination quality pale 
by comparison to CDCR’s, but there is virtually no interface between 
the respective websites of the two agencies, which presents an 
enormous obstacle to any effort to trace population movements across 
the state/county jurisdictional divide.  
I do not mean to argue that BSCC has been entirely ineffectual. 
The agency has processed grants for county programs and offered 
supervision of county facilities.66 What is important to stress, 
however, is that this has taken the form of information and advice, 
rather than centralized control—and, more importantly, that despite 
the appointment of two top CDCR officials to BSCC, the latter does 
not offer stakeholders—families of incarcerated people, advocates, 
lawyers, scholars, the general public—a true understanding of the way 
people move, in real life, between facilities. This evinces a bias toward 
the mechanic-jurisdictional understanding of counties and states as 
separate realms, rather than for the organic-geographic understanding 
that, for real people in real time and space, these facilities are located 
on a continuum of movement on both the individual and the aggregate 
levels.  
The only effort to systematically harmonize state- and county-
level data in California is the Multi-County Study (MSC), a joint 
venture between the BSCC and the Public Policy Institute of 
California (PPIC). Unfortunately, the only participating counties are 
Alameda, Contra Costa, Fresno, Humboldt, Kern, Los Angeles, 
Orange, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Francisco, Shasta, and 
 
66 Among BSCC’s lesser-known responsibilities, for example, is the tracking of 
sterilizations performed on incarcerated people, following the shocking exposé of 
the Center for Investigative Reporting of forced sterilizations at CDCR 
facilities. Corey Johnson, Female Inmates Sterilized in California Prisons Without 
Approval, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (July 7, 
2013), https://revealnews.org/article/female-inmates-sterilized-in-california-
prisons-without-approval/; Inmate Sterilization Procedures (SB 1135) Data 
Collection, BSCC CALIFORNIA, https://www.bscc.ca.gov/m_dataresearch/. 
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Stanislaus—a problem somewhat mitigated by the fact that the 
aggregate population of these jails is two-thirds of the state’s jail 
population.67 The next section shows how important this data 
collection effort has been to understand how counties responded to the 
jurisdictional population shifts. 
Jail Conditions in the Post-Plata Decade and the Prospect of the 
Hydra Problem  
 
 When Schlanger wrote about Realigment, shortly after its 
enactment, she found “deep dissensus among observers about the 
prospects for nonincarcerative county responses,” with some 
commentators labeling the incentive structure “a liberal fantasy” and 
others welcoming the need to implement uncomfortable change. One 
of Schlanger’s interviewees, sheriff’s lobbyist Nick Warner, was 
remarkably prophetic:  he observed that, in some counties, there were 
"a lot of good things going on," while in others, he predicted, "we'll 
have overcrowded local jails, and people will sue the pants off us."68 
Schlanger referred to the possible result of such variation, and 
resulting healthcare failures at the county level, as a “potential hydra 
problem,” after the famous mythological creature who, whenever her 
head would be cut off, would sprout two heads in its place. The 
concern was that incarcerated people and their lawyers, rather than 
filing one lawsuit against the entire state apparatus, would find 
themselves fighting multiple legal battles against various county jails.  
 Indeed, as PPIC researchers found through the MSC data in 2015, 
realignment alone did not result in a concerted decarceration effort at 
the county level.69 The immediate effect of realignment was a 
simultaneous population decline in state prisons and population 
increase in county jails. The jail population continued to rise at a 
steady pace until the November 2014 passage of Proposition 47, which 
reclassified several drug and property offenses as misdemeanors. 
 
67 Grattet et al., supra note 25.     
68 Schlanger, supra note 22, at 194.    
69 Magnus Lofstrom & Brandon Martin, Proposition 47 Brought Decreases to Both 
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Proposition 47 had a salutary effect on both state and county facilities. 
At the state level, in combination with building and renting additional 
prison beds, it helped CDCR finally reach the population reduction 
target required by Brown v. Plata.  As shown in Figure 1, at the county 
level, the passage of Proposition 47 resulted in an almost immediate 
population reduction, from 82,000 in October to 72,000 in November, 
bringing the jail population back under the statewide rated capacity of 
nearly 80,000 beds. This also resulted in 20% fewer releases due to 
housing constraints.  
 
Figure 1: Adult Jail Population and Capacity Releases in California 
County Jails, 2010-2014 
 
 
 Source: Public Policy Institute of California 
 
 PPIC researchers expressed concerns that the relief for jail 
populations was temporary; data through March 2015 for Los Angeles 
County, for example, showed that the jail population dipped below 
16,000 in December (down from more than 18,000 in October), but 
rose above 17,000 in January and stayed above 17,000 through March. 
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But a retrospective view of the aggregate population changes on the 
BSCC population dashboard reveals that, generally speaking, Prop 
47’s effect was salutary and lasting. Figure 2 depicts jail population 
and releases due to housing constraints since the passage of Prop. 47, 
showing consistent bookings close to (but below) the aggregate 
capacity of county facilities, and a more-or-less consistent rate of 
releases to ensure an acceptable level of crowding. 
 
Figure 2: Average Daily Population, Rated Capacity, and Bookings 
in California County Jails, 2015-2021 
 
 
Source: BSCC Jail Population Dashboard 
 
 It is important to point out that the trends reviewed above were 
observable on the aggregate level. On the individual jail level, counties 
dramatically differed in terms of their reliance on incarceration versus 
noncustodial alternatives. A comparative study of twelve counties 
conducted by RAND researchers in 2015 found considerable variation 
in policies, practices, jail admissions, and jail release patterns.70 In San 
Francisco and Stanislaus counties, jail populations did not rise after 
Realignment. Fresno, Kern, Los Angeles, Riverside, Sacramento, San 
 
70 Susan Turner et al., Public Safety Realignment in Twelve California 
Counties, RAND (2015), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_re
ports/RR800/RR872/RAND_RR872.pdf.   
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Bernardino, San Diego, and Stanislaus counties were using early 
releases, and each had one or more facilities under a court-ordered 
population cap. Some of these counties had been using early releases 
and noncustodial alternatives before realignment to manage their 
populations. In interviews conducted by the researchers, different 
stakeholders expressed different concerns: while probation officers 
thought that their counties balanced incarceration and rehabilitation, 
sheriff’s departments expressed strong concerns about jail crowding 
and the need to cope with people serving long sentences in county 
facilities by providing programming that was previously unnecessary. 
In some of these counties, such as Los Angeles and San Francisco, 
struggles erupted between county officials and local activists 
regarding plans to build new facilities or expand old ones to 
accommodate newcomers.  
 This new landscape in county jails would confirm Schlanger’s 
concerns about the hydra problem even prior to the COVID-19 crisis. 
In addition to the aforementioned court-mandated population caps in 
several California counties, which preceded Realignment, Schlanger 
(who wrote her article in 2013) mentioned the filing of the Prison Law 
Office’s first jail case, in Fresno, and the expansion of the ACLU of 
Southern California’s work on conditions in Los Angeles county jails. 
She also observed that some ongoing prison litigation, such as 
Armstrong and Valdivia, would encompass supervision of 
proceedings in jails as well.   
 I provided this lengthy pre-COVID-19 account of county jails to 
foreshadow the havoc that the pandemic would wreak on these 
facilities and, more specifically, the systemic weaknesses and 
oversights that would be revealed during the pandemic crisis. As we 
have seen, the remedy for the prison healthcare crisis exhibited the 
same shortsightedness as the cure: the notion that prisons and jails are 
separate, distinct entities, disjointed because of their differing 
jurisdictional statuses, and that jails could therefore be used as a 
depressurizing valve for problems in prisons without much regard to 
how these solutions would impact the jails themselves. The 
decentralization of jails, the paucity of centralized information of high 
quality, and the absence of systematic interface between the prison and 
jail data systems, would obscure important interactions between the 
facilities. Any efforts to help the jail’s heterogenous, transient 
population, through political advocacy or through legislation, would 
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struggle in the absence of data, and would face challenges in securing 
counsel and providing timely relief. Most importantly, the COVID-19 
crisis in prisons would exacerbate the crisis in jails, this time using the 
depressurizing valve to prevent intake, and pushing the jails to fend 
for themselves. 
 
Part III: The Chickens Come Home to Roost: COVID-19 and the 
Failure of the Jurisdictional Approach 
Agnotology: The Paucity of Jail-Level Data as a Social Fact 
 Agnotology, a term coined by Robert Proctor and Iain Boal,71 is 
the study of culturally induced ignorance or doubt, particularly the 
publication of inaccurate or misleading scientific data. In 
epistemological areas such as climate change72 and vaccination,73 
attention to agnotology can reveal the political and cultural roots of 
mistaken opinions or information gaps and develop educational and 
persuasive countermeasures. 
 Agnotology plays an important role in understanding the 
production of knowledge (or lack thereof) about criminal justice and 
correctional topics. The prevalence of myths about racial crime rates74 
and sex crimes75 is well documented in the literature. But agnotology 
also examines glaring information gaps, treating them not as 
coincidental but as social facts that are important in themselves. For 
example, in his book When Police Kill76  Franklin Zimring devotes 
 
71 ROBERT N. PROCTOR, AGNOTOLOGY: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF 
IGNORANCE (Robert N. Proctor & Londa Schiebinger eds., 2008). 
72 Daniel Bedford & John Cook, Agnotology, Scientific Consensus, and the Teaching 
and Learning of Climate Change: A Response to Legates, Soon and Briggs, 22 SCI 
& EDUC 2019 (2013).  
73 See generally SCIENCE AND THE PRODUCTION OF IGNORANCE: WHEN THE QUEST 
FOR KNOWLEDGE IS THWARTED (Janet Kourany & Michael Carrier eds., Cambridge: 
MIT Press 2020).   
74 John Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role 
of Racial Stereotypes, 41 AM. J. OF POL. SCI., 375, 375 – 401 (1997).   
75 James F. Quinn et al., Societal Reaction to Sex Offenders: A Review of the Origins 
and Results of the Myths Surrounding their Crimes and 
Treatment Amenability, 25 DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 215 (2004).   
76 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, WHEN POLICE KILL (Harvard University Press 2017). 
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considerable attention to the incompleteness of governmental statistics 
on incidents in which police officers exercised lethal force, comparing 
them unfavorably to journalistic tallies of such incidents. Similarly, in 
her book American Roulette,77 Sarah Beth Kaufman discusses the 
sociological meaning of a lack of any centralized database containing 
information about capital trials.   
Any discussion of the COVID-19 crisis in jails must begin with 
the epistemological question: what do we know about the crisis? What 
do we not know? And how do we know what we know? As I explained 
in Part II, obtaining complete data in a usable format has always been 
a challenge with county jails, and BSCC’s efforts to centralize data 
collection resulted in a sparse, user-unfriendly database that did not 
interface with CDCR’s database. The COVID-19 contagion was no 
exception.  
For almost five months, there was no official, centralized data 
collection project on COVID-19 in county jails. CDCR began 
collecting data on the spread of COVID-19 at its institutions—state 
prisons-- on March 1078; even though the tool evinced some delays in 
reporting deaths and some unclarity as to the categories it used, it at 
least provided information on cumulative and active cases, deaths, and 
testing rates. No equivalent tool tracked cases in counties. For months, 
there was great variation in the amount and type of information 
reported by the counties, as well as the format in which it was offered. 
Some sheriff’s departments offered a webpage with their COVID-19 
readiness protocols (such as the cancelation of visitation.) Others 
reported only on active cases.  
Advocates and public health experts had warned, early in the 
course of the pandemic spread, that jails posed a bigger infection and 
transmissivity risk than prisons, due to the transience of their 
populations. At public meetings in which activists demanded statistics 
about COVID-19 spread in jails, BSCC leadership waffled about 
centralized data collection efforts; Linda Penner, the board’s chair, 
said this was an “unprecedented time” and that teams were being as 
responsive as possible helping; but that collecting and publishing data 
about county jail disease outbreaks would not be a priority. The 
Sacramento Bee quoted Penner as saying, “We don’t want to sound 
 
77 SARAH BETH KAUFMAN, AMERICAN ROULETTE: THE SOCIAL LOGIC OF DEATH 
PENALTY SENTENCING TRIALS (The Univ. of Cal. Press 2020). 
78 Population COVID-19 Tracking, CA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS AND 
REHABILITATION, https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/covid19/population-status-tracking/.   
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like bureaucrats, but we also have to be well aware of the magnitude 
of this across the state and the various other reporting requirements 
locals have. We try to balance that conundrum right now.”79 
In the absence of centralized data collection, the task of informing 
the public about serious county jail outbreaks—several of which 
occurred during the spring of 2020—was almost exclusively 
performed by newspaper exposés. On April 27, the Los Angeles Times 
reported of the untimely death of 52-year-old Riverside County’s 
deputy Sheriff Terell Young, who “for two weeks in early March. . . 
routinely drove inmates, one at a time. . . to a hospital for medical 
appointments” and was exposed, during those trips, “to several people, 
including inmates and a nurse, who would later test positive for the 
coronavirus infection.”80 As of late April, the jail reported 136 cases 
and two deaths—one of a jail resident and one of another deputy. The 
article compared the sheriff’s rebuke of jail releases as an essential 
emergency measure by comparing it to a serious outbreak at the Los 
Angeles jail complex (whose population numbered 11,866 at the 
time); by late April, 71 jail resident and 61 staff members had tested 
positive, and a nurse had died.81 In June, the Sacramento Bee reported 
that Fresno County Jail had quarantined 1200 residents, after 13 who 
had been transferred to a state prison tested positive. In Sacramento 
County, five jail residents tested positive for COVID-19—information 
that took the Bee 10 days to obtain from the Sheriff’s office. Officials 
were also slow to report of an outbreak at the jail in Auburn, Placer 
County, where 17 residents and a correctional officer tested positive. 
The newspaper noted that none of those three counties regularly 
posted information about COVID-19 in their facilities. In the face of 
county sheriffs’ resistance to release the data, BSCC’s position was, 
again, astonishingly laissez-faire: BSCC Chair Linda Penner 
mentioned that she was having conversations about data tracking, but 
that the board’s hands were largely tied and it was on local health and 
jail officials to decide how much information to share. She expressed 
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80 Alene Tchekmedyian & Kailyn 
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concerns that “if [the data reporting was to be done] based on self-
reporting COVID cases to us jail by jail, I think there’s a concern that 
there would be issues with accuracy.”82  
 By mid-July, the paucity of data became a serious problem, and 
Penner finally wrote a memorandum to all county sheriffs, informing 
them that a centralized data collection effort would be underway, and 
that their assistance would be necessary.83 The letter required the 
sheriffs to report “the number of new positive COVID-19 tests for 
both residents and staff (reported separately), and deaths at each 
facility each week. We will also make a one-time request for your 
facilities’ cumulative COVID-19 case information and deaths to date”. 
In addition, Penner requested that each sheriff’s department ensure 
that “your facility health care providers are immediately reporting 
detailed case-level COVID-19 data to your county public health 
COVID-19 Data Dashboard Page 2 agency. Every facility 
administrator should work with their health care providers to ensure 
that data are being reported timely and completely to your county 
public health department.”  
 The resulting database, which went live in late July, was 
disappointingly sparse and unwieldy.84 Not only was the data 
presented per individual facility, with no analysis or aggregate data 
functions, but it was bound to allow outbreaks to occur undetected; 
per Penner’s request to the sheriffs, any number of infections below 
11 would be reported and displayed as “<11”, with no information as 
to testing rates. Needless to say, the database did not interface at all 
with CDCR’s tracking tool, making it impossible to contact-trace 
across the jurisdictional divide. 
But even after the BSCC data collection effort, massive outbreaks 
continued to occur undetected. On August 27, 2020, KQED journalists 
reported on a massive outbreak at the Fresno County Jail—at least 
 
82 Jason Pohl, ‘A moral failure’: California not tracking jail inmates and staff 
infected with coronavirus, SACRAMENTO BEE, (Jun. 23, 
2020), https://www.sacbee.com/news/coronavirus/article243724172.html.   
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1,115 inmates and 76 employees had tested positive, 21 of whom had 
been hospitalized—and sought an explanation from the California 
Department of Public Health (CDPH). The Department’s 
spokesperson replied that CDPH collected information on jails from 
county health officials but did not publish it because it was often 
“incomplete”; the spokesperson attributed the data quality problem to 
the high volume of cases and inadequate resources for counties to 
report them.85 
 In the absence of useful data through official channels, other 
actors stepped in to fill the gaps. Launched on March 24 by Sharon 
Dolovich and Aaron Littman,86 UCLA’s COVID-19 Behind Bars Data 
Project87 began collecting data on a national level, including federal, 
state, and local facilities. The project has been tracking infection rates, 
hospitalization, deaths, recoveries, transfers, testing, etc., for all 
correctional institutions, but found it difficult to obtain data on jails. 
On its webpage, the Project explains that data collection depends on 
data quality and availability, as “correctional authorities vary 
dramatically in what they report publicly” and “[t]here have been 
instances when the values reported by an agency changed over time in 
ways that were unexpected based on the description of the variable.” 
The variation in reporting quality poses special difficulty in the 
context of testing, which “vary widely by correctional agency. As a 
result, true case counts are likely higher than reported, and the extent 
of this underdetection is extremely variable.” Another area of concern 
is the lack of reliable reporting on staff infections, as “[s]ome 
jurisdictions leave it to staff members’ discretion whether to report 
positive test results they receive from community healthcare 
providers. As a result, the number of staff cases reported may be lower 
even than the number detected by testing.”88 
A glance at the Project’s California page reveals that, even as of 
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February 28, 2021, they do not have reliable data for several California 
jails. The Project does not rely on the BSCC database for its numbers; 
instead, it scrubs data from the more informative databases for the 
individual sheriff’s departments, and relies on external, reliable 
sources for the rest.89  
One such resource is a regional collection effort by the Davis 
Vanguard, which includes an accessible database covering several 
counties.90 The Davis Vanguard relies on the websites maintained by 
the Sheriff’s departments in Alameda, San Francisco, Solano, Yolo, 
Los Angeles, Orange, Santa Clara, and Sacramento counties; the 
Vanguard also reports BSCC numbers, but state that the BSCC 
database “remains incomplete as many facilities have refused to 
comply. Further, it does not contain historical data prior to July 20.”91 
Importantly, the Vanguard’s reporting includes information about 
quarantines of specific units in some of the jails, as well as about 
testing rates where available.  
Notably, these academic and journalistic efforts are supplemented 
by efforts by private individuals who pore over data from specific jails. 
For example, UC Berkeley law student Darby Aono maintains her 
own database of the Santa Rita jail which, in addition to population, 
case numbers, and testing rates, includes information on quarantines 
by housing unit.92  
That a serious, rigorous actor such as the UCLA COVID-19 Data 
Project prefers to avail itself of these alternative sources, rather than 
of the incomplete BSCC data, is an important social fact. It brings to 
mind Franklin Zimring’s aforementioned effort93 to quantify lethal 
force exercised by law enforcement. Zimring compared the FBI 
database to those maintained by the Washington Post and the 
Guardian, finding that the official statistics left out about half of the 
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https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Ufb0C8-cRf10glzfnN-
mi_hrE1jfdvDYg4KkIuc-VB8/edit#gid=1601012795. 
93 ZIMRING, supra note 76, at 25. 
  
Summer 2021 Bottleneck 106 
lethal incidents, and relying for his analysis and recommendations on 
the journalistic databases. Such data collection gaps by governmental 
agencies are not unimportant: handling complicated, tragic 
phenomena requires careful study of its extent and distribution, and 
neglect in this area can cast doubt on the seriousness that is ascribed 
to these tragedies and the efficacy of the efforts to prevent and address 
them—as we see in the next section.   
The COVID-19 Experience in County Jails 
 
Even before the pandemic, multiple experts and officials urged 
correctional authorities at all levels to reduce their populations and 
adopt measures to prevent the spread of disease. In early March, when 
San Francisco saw only 13 cases, San Francisco Public Defender 
Mano Raju sent a letter to San Francisco Sheriff Paul Miyamoto, 
expressing his “serious concern” that the more than 1,100 inmates 
living together in San Francisco’s jails could be susceptible to the 
contagious disease. Raju warned Miyamoto about the specific risks to 
the pretrial detainee population, writing: “The constant flow of both 
staff and detainees in an out of the jails — where large numbers of 
people are housed in close proximity — means that a powerful virus 
like COVID-19 can take over quickly and easily.”94 
Jails differed greatly in the precautionary steps they took. In early 
March, the Sacramento Bee reported that the Merced County Sheriff’s 
Office announced that it would halt visitation at two county facilities 
as a temporary, “precautionary measure”, and started conducting 
visitor screenings; by contrast, a Fresno County Sheriff’s Office 
spokesman said the agency had no plans to halt visitation and was 
“constantly educating inmates, staff and visitors about the importance 
of good hygiene.” Sacramento County reported it had not changed 
anything about its daily operations, intake screening, jail visitation or 
communicable disease practices because they were already 
“sufficient.” Placer County, where a cruise ship passenger had died on 
March 4, said it would not answer basic questions regarding its jail 
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policies without a formal request under California’s Public Records 
Act.95 Remarkably, in late March, the San Francisco Chronicle 
reported that Solano County sheriff’s deputies were driving to other 
county jails and picking up recently freed people on minor traffic 
offenses, then transporting them to their own jail.96 
This variation, as well as the difficulties of coordinating a 
response to the closure of prisons to jail transfers, were at the root of 
the COVID-19 problem in jails. On March 24, in an effort to curb the 
contagion in state prisons, Governor Newsom issued an executive 
order directing the CDCR Secretary to temporarily halt the intake 
and/or transfer of inmates and youth into the state’s 35 prisons and 
four youth correctional facilities.97 The stoppage of jail intakes did not 
completely eliminate the risk to state prison residents; indeed, 
transfers between facilities continued, resulting in several cases—
notably, the infamous outbreak at San Quentin prison—from botched 
transfers from other state prisons.98 
The closure of prisons created a bottleneck in jails, jamming the 
flow of residents in and out of county facilities. This resulted in serious 
overcrowding, which was documented in several lawsuits brought on 
behalf of jail population. In late April, the American Civil Liberties 
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Union filed lawsuits against Gov. Newsom and Attorney General 
Xavier Becerra, demanding that jail populations be reduced: 
“Outbreaks at local jails and juvenile facilities threaten to tax the 
broader community’s health care system beyond capacity. This 
impending viral explosion — imminently likely to occur in most, if 
not all, of California’s 58 counties — will directly impact all 
California residents, including correctional staff, their families, and 
their respective communities.”99   
The situation in Orange County, described by Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor in her dissent in Barnes v. Ahlman100—a class action suit 
on behalf of the Orange County jail population—was emblematic of 
these problems. Relying on “dozens of inmate declarations,” Justice 
Sotomayor summarized the situation as follows: 
 
Although the Jail had been warned that “social distancing is 
the cornerstone of reducing transmission of COVID–19,” 
inmates described being transported back and forth to the jail in 
crammed buses, socializing in dayrooms with no space to distance 
physically, lining up next to each other to wait for the phone, 
sleeping in bunk beds two to three feet apart, and even being 
ordered to stand closer than six feet apart when inmates tried to 
socially distance. Moreover, although the Jail told its inmates that 
they could “best protect” themselves by washing their hands with 
“soap and water throughout the day,” numerous inmates reported 
receiving just one small, hotel-sized bar of soap per week. And after 
symptomatic inmates were removed from their units, other inmates 
were ordered to dispose of their belongings without gloves or other 
protective equipment. Finally, despite the Jail’s stated policy to test 
and isolate individuals who reported or exhibited symptoms 
consistent with COVID–19, multiple symptomatic detainees 
described being denied tests, and others recounted sharing common 
spaces with infected or symptomatic inmates. 
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Two jail residents, José Armendariz and Lonnie Kocontes, 
described the conditions in an interview with CalMatters.101 The two 
said that they had witnessed jail staff fail to follow cleaning protocols, 
particularly when distributing pills to residents from plastic pill bags 
or handling inhalers. They reported that the staff frequently did not 
wear masks, and that the masks for residents were made from torn-up 
bedsheets that they were required to wrap around their faces. They also 
reported that inmate workers use soiled rags to clean communal spaces 
after mealtimes; according to Armendariz, residents are required to 
buy their own rags to clean with from the jail’s commissary, and that 
cleaning supplies are so diluted that they are almost 
useless. Armendariz and Kocontes also described the residents’ 
response to the conditions: creating their own quarantine system:  
 
New arrivals are told not to touch anything — newspapers, 
communal surfaces, the phones attached to the wall — for 12 days 
after they arrive in the medical unit. There is one phone 
designated for new inmates.  
“We don’t touch that one even if it’s open. You just line up 
and wait for a different one,” Armendariz said.102 
  
 Similar problems were reported in a class action lawsuit on behalf 
of the Tulare County jail population, filed in July 2020. The plaintiffs 
accused the sheriff of failing to implement state-mandated health 
protocols to protect their health; one of the attorneys, ACLU attorney 
Kathleen Guneratne, reported that jail residents “described ‘alarming,’ 
‘cramped,’ and ‘restrictive’ conditions, including prolonged hours of 
confinement, where inmates are stuck in their cells for more than 23 
hours per day.” Jail residents reported that those who were sick were 
being “neglected, denied medical attention, and ignored when they 
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asked to be tested. Many were shuffled in and out of cells and around 
the facility, potentially exposing others to infection.” 103  
Some of the neglect stemmed from staff shortages, a chronic 
problem plaguing both state prisons and county jails—particularly in 
distant, rural locations.104 Other problems involved misallocation of 
funds intended for COVID-19 care relief; the Orange County Sheriff’s 
Department, which received $90 million in federal coronavirus 
response money, spent the vast majority of the funds to pay for salaries 
and benefits of existing jail staff.105 Yet more problems resulted from 
the architecture of different jails. According to a class-action lawsuit 
on behalf of the Los Angeles County Jails’ population, the prisoners 
in the Los Angeles County jails are crowded into open dormitories and 
two-person cells the size of parking spaces. They are sleeping inches 
from one another and cannot practice social distancing. Officers don’t 
always wear masks, and prisoners’ masks aren’t replaced regularly.106 
The plight of one of the plaintiffs, Tereza Gomez, was told in an op-
ed in the Los Angeles Times: Gomez learned she was pregnant shortly 
after her arrest in August. After testing positive for COVID-19 in 
October, she was moved to a small, windowless, dirty solitary 
confinement cell and locked in for 23 hours a day — punitive 
conditions the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has warned 
will deter prisoners from reporting symptoms. A scheduled obstetric 
wellness exam was canceled because of her COVID-19 status. And 
her criminal case has come to a standstill; the courts have repeatedly 
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canceled hearings due to COVID risks.107 
 
Zero Bail as a Depressurizing Valve  
 
Handling COVID-19 in cramped, inappropriate facilities, without 
transfers to prisons, required another depressurizing valve—and the 
answer came from the courts. On April 6th, the Judicial Council of 
California moved to set a statewide emergency bail schedule 
that reduced bail to $0 for most misdemeanor and some low-level 
felony offenses, for 90 days, starting April 15.108 Because 
approximately 75% of the jail population consists of pretrial detainees, 
the emergency measure resulted in considerable population reduction. 
As reported by the Prison Policy Initiative109 and elsewhere, by the 
end of May, jail populations in Los Angeles110 and Sacramento 
Counties111 had decreased by over 30%. Orange County’s jail 
population dropped by almost 45% in the same period,112 while other 
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counties—including San Diego,113 San Mateo,114 and Stanislaus115--
also released hundreds of people held pretrial.  
The results of the measure were mixed. Sheriff’s departments in 
Alameda and Ventura counties reported that the reduced number of 
residents was amenable to cohorting, which slowed the spread of the 
pandemic116; nevertheless, outbreaks occurred at both locations, 
including the death of six residents in total in Ventura117 and a serious 
outbreak in Alameda County’s Santa Rita Jail.118 The Santa Rita 
outbreak prompted the Alameda County Public Defender, Brendon 
Woods, to call for the immediate release of more than 100 inmates 
who have less than six months left to serve as an emergency measure; 
District Attorney Nancy O’Malley declined, arguing that she could not 
“jeopardize the safety of victims or the community.”119 
In June, during the phased reopening of the state, the Judicial 
Council voted to end the emergency zero bail measure, leaving it up 
to the individual county courts “to continue to use the emergency 
COVID-19 bail schedule where necessary to protect the health of the 
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community, the courts, and the incarcerated.”120  Thirty-one counties 
(collectively housing about 80% of California residents) elected to 
keep the emergency bail schedule in place.121 The outcome, again, 
reflected the atomized, jurisdictional nature of jail policies. A 
population tracking tool created by the Vera Institute of Justice shows 
wide variation in the population trends of various California 
counties.122 The highest decreases are reported in Yuba (-48%), 
Orange (-39%), Marin (-31%), Santa Clara (-29%) and San Francisco 
(-26%) counties. Tehama County increased its jail population by 28%, 
followed by Monterey (+7%) and Placer (+1%) counties. Notably—
again—the data evinces an agnotology problem: the tracking tool 
reports populations for only 16 counties. 
 
The Hydra Rears Its Ugly Heads: Litigation 
 
 As explained in the previous sections, Prof. Schlanger’s 
prediction that healthcare litigation in the post-Plata era would take 
the shape of the mythical hydra has come true. In California, and 
nationwide, numerous lawsuits were filed on behalf of both prison and 
jail populations—some as consolidated habeas corpus petitions, some 
as class action lawsuits, and some, tragically, as wrongful death 
grievances.  
 In a forthcoming article, Brandon Garrett and Lee Kovarski 
analyzed hundreds of COVID-19 in correctional settings. They found 
that judges tended to avoid constitutional holdings as much as 
possible, rejected requests for ongoing supervision, and resisted mass 
releases as a remedy, opting instead to limit such relief to vulnerable 
subpopulations. They also found that moral worth and deservedness 
played a role in litigant success: the most successful litigants were 
detainees in custody pending immigration proceedings, and the least 
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successful were those convicted of crimes.123 
In Garrett and Kovarski’s typology, jail residents occupy an 
interesting place. On one hand, they consist mostly of pretrial 
detainees who, of course, are presumed innocent; on the other, they 
sometimes require courts to pore into conditions in small facilities in 
remote locations, which can be labor intensive if supervision is 
necessary. In addition, the remedies sought in jail lawsuits run the 
gamut between improved healthcare protocols (PPE supplies, social 
distancing, mask mandates for staff) and population reduction orders.  
Of particular interest was the federal litigation involving COVID-
19 protocols in the Orange County jail system. In late May, District 
Court Judge Jesus G. Bernal ordered the sheriff to enforce social 
distancing, administer regular testing, and distribute cleaning supplies 
and hand sanitizers.124 The sheriff appealed the order all the way to the 
Supreme Court which, in a 5-4, stayed the lower court’s preliminary 
injunction. 
The decision was brief, with only Justice Sotomayor writing in 
dissent that the decision to stay the injunction was “extraordinary.” 
Ordinarily, the conditions for granting a stay require (1) a “reasonable 
probability” that SCOTUS will actually grant certiorari to hear the 
case, (2) a “fair prospect” that SCOTUS will subsequently reverse the 
decision on the merits, and (3) “a likelihood that irreparable harm 
[will] result from the denial of a stay”. None of these applied in the 
Orange County litigation: the Ninth Circuit ruled on clearly 
established law–it found ample proof of “deliberate indifference” 
because the jails were forewarned about this months ago and knew the 
risks—and, even if the Eighth Amendment constituted insufficient 
grounds for relief, there would be an alternative claim under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. The odds that the Supreme Court 
would grant certiorari and hear the case, therefore, were slim—and, 
worst of all, the “likelihood of irreparable harm” was obvious from the 
 
123 Brandon L. Garrett & Lee Kovarsky, Viral Injustice, 2021-15 CAL. L. R., 
(forthcoming 2021).  
124 Order (1) Granting-in-Part and Denying-in-Part Plaintiffs’ Application for 
Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 41); and (2) 
Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Provisional Class Certification (Dkt. No. 42), 
Melissa Ahlman, et al. v. Don Barnes, et al., No. SACV 20-835 JGB (SHKx) (D. 
Cal. C.D. May 26, 2020). 
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facts, which are quoted in a previous subsection. 
The extent (and expense) to which the sheriff, who according to 
the claims in Ahlman, did not provide PPE to jail residents, went in 
challenging the decision were remarkable, especially in light of the 
fact that the remedy granted was not a mass release but merely a 
mandate regarding health protocol. But the Orange County mess 
would eventually result in a more dramatic remedy. Some jail 
residents filed habeas corpus writs with the Orange County Superior 
Court—which, on December 11, 2020, ordered the jail to reduce its 
population by 50%.125  
In his decision, Judge Peter Wilson recounted the facts, which 
painted—as in Ahlman v. Barnes—a horrifying picture of the COVID 
experience at the jail. Not only was it impossible, given the conditions 
in the facility, for residents to socially distance, staff behavior was not 
monitored when they were away from the facility. Amazingly, staff 
were not tested unless they requested to be, even if they displayed 
symptoms. The staff was provided PPE but were not required to wear 
it. Housing decisions did not take medical vulnerability into account. 
None of these facts, which were backed by statements from medical 
experts and staff members, were contradicted by respondents with any 
evidence. 
The decision was a pretty straightforward application of an earlier 
Court of Appeal decision in In re Von Staich, regarding the San 
Quentin outbreak.126 In Von Staich, the court applied the procedural 
standard from People v. Duvall127, according to which, on habeas 
corpus, the respondent (in this case, the correctional facility) must 
state facts in its return brief—and if it does not do so (for example, if 
it merely denies the petitioner’s allegations) no evidentiary hearing is 
granted. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal agreed with the expert 
opinions and memos by medical experts, which estimated that proper 
social distancing could only be achieved through a population 
reduction, and found nothing in respondent’s briefs to contradict these 
findings. 
In Campbell, Judge Wilson found that the Orange County Sheriff 
 
125 Order on Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Mandate, Campbell et al. v. Barnes, 
No. 30-2020-1141117 (Cal. Super. Ct., Cty. of Orange, Dec. 11, 2020). 
126 In re Von Staich, 56 Cal. App. 5th 53 (2020).  
127 People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 483, 476 (1995). 
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took a page from the San Quentin Warden’s litigation strategy and 
limited his response to denying the jail residents’ allegations. As a 
consequence, Judge Wilson relied on the facts argued by the 
petitioners to establish that an Eighth Amendment violation had 
occurred—in other words, that the sheriff exhibited “deliberate 
indifference” to the health and safety of the jail population. 
Consequently, the court granted the specific petitioners in Campbell 
immediate relief, in the form of release or transfer. For everyone else 
in the Orange County Jail, the court modeled its order after the Von 
Staich order, with some more specificity: it ordered population 
reductions of at least 50% in all dormitories–and, if this were to be 
insufficient to achieve proper distancing, even further reductions. 
 
The District Attorney criticized the decision,128 arguing that the 
population reduction order “will release dangerous and violent 
criminals back into our neighborhoods to commit more crimes and 
victimize more people.” The sheriff—only days after declaring that 
his deputies would not enforce Gov. Newsom’s stay-at-home 
order129—issued a statement: "We are evaluating the order, its impacts 
and our options for appeal. . . If the order stands, it will result in the 
release of more than 1,800 inmates."130 
It will be interesting to see how the case fares at the appellate 
level. Importantly, since the decision in Campbell, Von Staich was 
reversed by the California Supreme Court131 and is now on its way 
back to the Marin Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing on 
whether the San Quentin authorities engaged in remedial measures 
 
128 Press Release, Orange County District Attorney Todd Spitzer Releases Statement 
Criticizing Court Ruling to Reduce County Jail Population by 50%, OFFICE OF THE 
DIST. ATTORNEY, (Dec. 12, 2020), 
http://orangecountyda.org/civica/press/display.asp?layout=15&Entry=6087.  
129 KJ Hiramoto, Orange County Sheriff says deputies will not enforce Gov. 
Newsom's new stay-at-home order, FOX 11 LOS ANGELES, (Dec. 6, 2020), 
https://www.foxla.com/news/orange-county-sheriff-says-deputies-will-not-
enforce-gov-newsoms-new-stay-at-home-order.  
130 Amy Powell, OC sheriff ordered by judge to reduce county's jail population by 
half amid COVID pandemic, ABC7 NEWS, (Dec. 12, 
2020), https://abc7.com/orange-county-jails-inmates-population/8722630/.  
131 In re Von Staich, 477 P. 3d 537 (2020). 
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sufficient to counter the court’s finding of deliberate indifference.132 
This could provide the District Attorney and Sheriff Barnes legal 
ammunition to force an evidentiary hearing, at which they could 
present evidence of mitigation to try and counter the “deliberate 
indifference” finding.  
What can we learn from the Orange County litigation and other 
jail cases? Encouragingly, the transience of jail populations has not 
stood in the way of obtaining class certification for class action 
lawsuits, or of obtaining excellent legal representation. In that respect, 
civil rights litigators have adapted well to the post-Plata world. In 
addition, the hesitance to grant population reduction orders, which is 
part of the federal legal landscape after the enactment of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act,133 seems not to have spilled over to state 
courts. The extent to which litigants will eventually prevail in 
affirming these orders remains to be seen. Another lesson from the 
similarities of Von Staich and Campbell is that, despite the 
jurisdictional differences, some judges are able to see that similar 
humanitarian problems plague both state and county facilities. 
 
Conclusion: Vaccines and Beyond 
 
The narrative so far demonstrates, I hope, the folly of approaching 
county jails from a mechanistic, jurisdictional perspective. The 
tendency to ignore and discount counties except when used to 
depressurize state prisons has resulted in a “hydra problem” of 
infections, human rights violations, haphazard release 
countermeasures, and a flurry of litigation with varying degrees of 
success.  
The same problems are evident not only in the disease, but in the 
distribution of the prophylactic. The advent of the Pfizer and Moderna 
vaccines opened a new avenue of advocacy on behalf of incarcerated 
 




133 Schlanger, supra note 22. 
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populations.134 Given the prioritization of vaccinating people in 
congregate housing settings, such as nursery homes, similar arguments 
were made in the context of prisons. The same arguments can, and 
should, be made on behalf of residents of county jails. In California, 
the concerted effort of advocates and experts led to the classification 
of people in prison as vaccine priorities, in Tier 1B; despite a 
disappointing January retraction of this policy,135 as of February 23, 
2021, 40 percent of the prison population has been vaccinated.136 
Despite understandable concerns that incarcerated people might 
harbor mistrust and suspicion of prison authorities, which would stand 
in the way of administering the vaccine, the acceptance rate among 
incarcerated people has been high; refusal rates have only been 
problematic among the staff.137 
It is here where, once again, the jurisdictional-mechanistic 
approach to county jails works to the detriment not only of their 
residents, but of all residents of the surrounding and neighboring 
counties: Even before it was rescinded, the California state mandate 
 
134 Hadar Aviram, Prisons Should Be a Priority for COVID Vaccine, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, (Dec. 4, 
2020), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Prisons-should-be-
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extends only to state prisons. Counties were left to decide for 
themselves whether to prioritize their jail populations and, as in other 
matters, there has been considerable variation. Bay Area counties are 
ramping up vaccination for their jail populations;138 Kings and Tulare 
counties are vaccinating aging and infirm jail residents, while Merced 
and Fresno Counties have no set date yet to begin vaccination in their 
jails.139  
While these variations in vaccine policies could be simply 
manifestations of supply shortages, they might also represent political 
pushback in the counties of the sort seen in other states regarding 
prisons. In Colorado, for example, Governor Jared Polis responded to 
public pressure by ignoring expert opinions on the urgency of 
vaccinating incarcerated people for public health and downgraded this 
population in his plan. The Director of the Center for Bioethics and 
Humanities at the University of Colorado criticized this decision as 
guided by “moralistic argument,” explaining that “[i]t’s a very 
stigmatized population, and there are people who say, ‘They’re in 
prison, they must have done something terrible, and they don’t deserve 
a place in line.’”140 
The prevalence of such “moralistic arguments,” which compound 
public health priorities with hierarchies of perceived deservedness, 
might play into the struggle for vaccination in jails. As explained 
above, 75% of the California jail population consists of pretrial 
detainees who, of course, are presumed innocent; it is not difficult to 
imagine an appeal to public policy that distinguishes between these 
people and the presumably “less deserving” people in state prisons.  
Despite its superficial rhetorical appeal, I strongly advise against 
relying on such an argument. Adopting the organic-geographical 
perspective that this article proposes implies seeing all incarcerated 
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people in California as part of one porous carceral network, along a 
continuum that reaches to the outside community. The bottleneck 
effects of the jurisdictional approach have led to outbreaks; the way 
out of this quagmire requires accepting the need for population 
equilibrium and population reductions throughout the entire 
correctional system, regardless of administration and budgeting levels. 
Part and parcel of this essential population reduction is opening the 
jail floodgates, not only through releases to the population, but also as 
a two-way flow to and from the prisons. Under such circumstances, it 
is unacceptable to continue mixing vaccinated and unvaccinated 
populations. Moreover, 25% of the jail population consists of 
sentenced individuals, many of them for felonies; taking the 
deservedness argument to its conclusion would lead to the absurd 
policy of vaccinating only some jail residents and leaving others 
exposed. Such a policy would be impossible to justify and would have 
unbearable equity and public health implications.   
Instead, I propose advocating the vaccination of the jail 
population by relying on two arguments with organic-geographical 
appeal. First, it must be clear that the transient jail population poses at 
least as much risk to the surrounding community as the staff working 
among the less transient prison population. The reasoning for 
vaccination in both cases should be the same. In addition, there is a 
practical consideration that should appeal to counties and 
municipalities: running a vaccination enterprise at a congregate 
housing location with permanent medical staff would ease vaccine 
distribution, help with the dissemination of medical information, 
protect county court personnel, and possibly have the ripple effect of 
generating more vaccine acceptance among family members and 
friends of people who are vaccinated during the course of their jail 
residency.  
While the project of vaccinating incarcerated populations is 
worthwhile, it raises the concern that the vaccine would come to be 
seen as the panacea for all correctional problems. This article’s review 
of the spillover of healthcare problems from prisons into jails should 
be a cautionary tale.  
My recommendations for remedying the broken healthcare 
structure in county jails require a paradigm change, which would view 
jails not through the jurisdictional-mechanistic perspective, but as 
organic parts of their surroundings and communities. Unifying the 
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administration of prisons and jails in California might be a pipe dream; 
however, at bare minimum, health care policies should be far better 
coordinated. Informational databases—not only involving healthcare, 
but also population shifts—should have seamless interfaces between 
state and county facilities (an inexcusable oversight in a state with 
such high technological literacy.) Aggressive efforts at hiring and 
retaining medical staff should target not only individual facilities, but 
also local county hospitals with an eye toward serving incarcerated 
populations as well. Most importantly, health care policies, ranging 
from preventative healthcare, nutrition and wellness, to emergency 
care, should start with families and schools, extending into jails and 
prisons as a continuum. These are crucial not only to curb the current 
pandemic, but also to prevent the pandemics of the future. 
